Threat Model: What Could Go Wrong
Why Think About Threats?
Every system has vulnerabilities. Pretending otherwise leads to failure. TogetherOS explicitly names threats so we can build defenses.
Threat 1: Plutocracy (Money Buys Power)
Attack: Wealthy members try to buy influence over decisions.
Defense: Support Points cannot be purchased. Ever. The firewall between money and governance power is absolute.
Remaining risk: Wealthy members could donate time to earn SP. This is acceptable โ time investment shows genuine commitment.
Threat 2: Populist Capture
Attack: Charismatic individual manipulates community into following them.
Defense:
- No permanent leadership positions
- All roles recallable
- Minority reports preserve dissent
- Mental flexibility as cultural value
Remaining risk: Charisma is hard to defend against. Culture of questioning helps.
Threat 3: Coordinator Corruption
Attack: External entity bribes or threatens coordinators.
Defense:
- Coordinators have no independent power
- Can be recalled at any time
- Corrupting a coordinator gains nothing
- Another coordinator takes their place
Remaining risk: Minimal. The design makes corruption unprofitable.
Threat 4: Sybil Attack (Fake Accounts)
Attack: Someone creates many fake accounts to gain voting power.
Defense:
- Onboarding process requires real engagement
- SP earned through contribution (can't fake contribution at scale)
- Verification options for high-stakes decisions
- Community moderation catches suspicious activity
Remaining risk: Small-scale sybil attacks possible but not profitable.
Threat 5: Burnout
Attack: Active members exhaust themselves, system collapses.
Defense:
- Task distribution algorithms prevent overload
- Recognition systems acknowledge contribution
- Role rotation prevents entrenchment
- Culture of sustainable pace
Remaining risk: Burnout is always possible. Systems help but can't fully prevent.
Threat 6: External Pressure
Attack: Powerful external entities (governments, corporations) pressure the community.
Defense:
- No single point of failure (distributed leadership)
- Transparent decision-making hard to secretly influence
- Legal structure designed for resilience
- Multiple instances can exist independently
Remaining risk: Determined attackers with resources are hard to stop. But distributed systems are harder to kill.
Threat 7: Apathy
Attack: Members stop participating. Decisions made by tiny minority.
Defense:
- Gamification rewards participation
- Regular communication about impact
- Low-barrier participation options
- Notification of important decisions
Remaining risk: Apathy is always possible. Can't force engagement.
Living Document
This threat model will evolve. As we learn about new vulnerabilities, we'll add defenses. Security is a process, not a destination.